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Abstract 
This study evaluates Japan's corporate tax reforms in the 2010s by estimating the effective 
average tax rate (EATR) and effective marginal tax rate (EMTR), common methods for 
international comparisons, using data on Japanese firms. Japan lowered its statutory tax 
rate while it expanded the tax base. The estimated EATR and EMTR declined in Japan, 
though the EATR decreased less than the statutory tax rate. This was due to the 
depreciation method reform. This study analyzes the differing effects of the tax rate 
reduction and depreciation method reform by conducting simulations to represent the 
effects of each reform on the EATR and EMTR. Japan’s tax reform in the 2010s lowered 
the EATR via the lower tax rate, while it raised the EMTR via the depreciation method 
reform. 
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This study evaluates Japan's corporate income tax reforms through the 2010s 
using firm-level financial data to estimate the effective corporate income tax rates. 
According to Steinmüller et al. (2019), who compare the statutory corporate income tax 
rates of countries worldwide, from the late 1990s to the early 2010s, Japan had one of the 
highest statutory tax rates in the world. Therefore, some argued that corporate income tax 
rates should be lowered to recover from the aftereffects of the Great Recession and 
strengthen the international competitiveness of companies. Thus, the Japanese 
government decided to lower the corporate income tax rate starting in FY2012. 
The policy goal at the time was to reduce the Ministry of Finance (MOF) -type 
effective corporate tax rate to the 20% range. This is a tax rate calculated by combining 
the national and local statutory tax rates and used as an indicator by Japan's MOF for 
international comparison. The national corporate income tax rate for large corporations 
with capital of 100 million yen or more was reduced from 30% in FY2011 to 23.2% in 
FY2018. The local corporate income tax rate was also reduced. Hence, the MOF-type 
effective corporate income tax rate, which was over 40% in the early 2000s, fell to 29.74% 
in FY2019. 
However, it is unclear whether the decline in the MOF-type effective tax rate led 
to an econometric decline in the effective corporate income tax rates. This study’s primary 
contribution to the literature is the calculation of the effective average tax rate (EATR) 
and the effective marginal tax rate (EMTR) developed in the pioneering work by 
Devereux and Griffith (2003). I use this data to evaluate Japan's corporate tax reforms in 
the 2010s.  
There is a second reason to evaluate Japan’s corporate income tax reform in 
terms of EATR and EMTR. As lowering the tax rates would reduce tax revenue, the 
Japanese government expanded the tax base by changing the depreciation method. 
Analyzing this aspect of the tax reform is the second contribution of this study. In FY2007, 
Japan abolished the old declining-balance method and introduced the “250% declining-
balance method” for depreciable assets other than buildings. While this method is a very 
accelerated depreciation mechanism, it also eroded the tax base. Therefore, it was 
changed to the “200% declining-balance method” in FY2011, and the legal depreciation 
method for structures changed from the declining-balance method to the straight-line 
method in FY2016. However, the MOF-type effective tax rate does not capture these 
changes in the depreciation system. Instead, I must evaluate them using EATR and EMTR 
estimates, though doing so requires an analysis of the asset composition of each company.  
Starting with Devereux and Griffith (2003), several studies provided EATR and 
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EMTR estimates for various countries (Suzuki, 2014; Hanappi, 2018; Steinmüller et al., 
2019; Millot et al., 2020; Spengel et al., 2020), thereby establishing the estimation method. 
Egger et al. (2009), Egger and Lorentz (2010), Steinmüller et al. (2019), and Federici et 
al. (2020) estimate firm-specific EATR and EMTR using financial statement data. The 
advantage of using financial data for individual companies is that it allows for the 
consideration of asset composition and funding diversity. Prior studies point out that 
EATR and EMTR vary by country and firm. While I use methods from these prior studies 
to estimate the EATR and EMTR, this study contributes to this research stream by 
estimating the effective corporate tax rates at the firm level using data from the individual 
financial statements of Japanese listed companies. 
In summary, this study estimates the EATR and EMTR by modeling national and 
local corporate tax rates in accordance with Japanese tax law. Second, the analysis reflects 
the asset composition and financing of Japanese firms. Third, I assume values for key 
economic variables, such as the real interest rate and the inflation rate, based on the 
economic situation in Japan to estimate more realistic EATR and EMTR values. Many 
previous studies use the same real interest rate and inflation rate for each country for 
international comparisons. This study compares the more realistic case for Japan to the 
assumptions often applied for international comparisons. 
 The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the 
model and data sources, and Section 3 presents the preliminary data. Section 4 provides 
the estimation results. Section 5 simulates the effects of the corporate income tax reforms, 
and Section 6 concludes with a summary and discussion of the findings. 
 
2. Model and data 
2.1. Model 
This study follows Devereux and Griffith (2003) to derive EATR and EMTR. 𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡 





,         (1) 
 
where 𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡 is the dividend paid in period t and 𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡 is the new equity issued in period t. 
γ = (1 −𝑚𝑚𝑑𝑑) (1− 𝑐𝑐)(1− 𝑧𝑧)⁄  is the effect of the tax on one unit of dividend. 𝑚𝑚𝑑𝑑 is 
the individual income tax rate on dividends, 𝑐𝑐 is the tax credit rate on dividend income, 
and 𝑧𝑧 is the capital gains tax rate. ρ = �1 −𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖�𝑖𝑖 (1 − 𝑧𝑧)⁄  is the discount rate for 
shareholders, where 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 is the personal income tax rate and 𝑖𝑖 is the nominal interest rate. 
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i = (1 + 𝑟𝑟)(1 + 𝜋𝜋)− 1, where 𝑟𝑟 is the real interest rate. 
I can express dividends, 𝐷𝐷, as 
 
𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡 = 𝑄𝑄(𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡−1)(1 − 𝜏𝜏) − 𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡 + [1 + 𝑖𝑖(1 − 𝜏𝜏)]𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝜏𝜏∅(𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡 + 𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡−1𝑇𝑇 ) + 𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡.  (2) 
 
In the above expression, Q(𝐾𝐾) is production, 𝐾𝐾 is the capital stock, 𝐼𝐼 is investment, 
𝐵𝐵 is debt, and τ is the statutory corporate income tax rate. ∅ is the depreciation rate 
and 𝐾𝐾𝑇𝑇 is the value of the capital stock for tax purposes. 
 To measure EATR, R is the change in the net present value (NPV): 
 





𝑠𝑠=0 .       (3) 
 
First, I consider the case when investment is financed by retained earnings. Devereux and 
Griffith (2003) account for the case when one unit of investment occurs in period t, 
causing the capital stock to increase, and the capital stock returns to its original level in 
period t+1. In this case, with 𝛿𝛿 as the economic capital depletion rate, the NPV of 
investment, 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 , is 
 
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 = −𝛾𝛾(1 − 𝐴𝐴) + 𝛾𝛾
1+𝜌𝜌
{(1 + 𝜋𝜋)(𝑝𝑝 + 𝛿𝛿)(1− 𝜏𝜏) + (1 + 𝜋𝜋)(1− 𝛿𝛿)(1− 𝐴𝐴)}.  (4) 
 
Here, 𝐴𝐴 is the discounted present value of the tax savings from depreciation. Assuming 
the declining-balance method and the straight-line method, they can be expressed as  
 






+ ⋯� = 𝜏𝜏∅(1+𝜌𝜌)
𝜌𝜌+∅
   (5) 
















where 𝐿𝐿 is the useful life of the asset.  
Second, I consider the change in the NPV, 𝐹𝐹𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅, when the investment is financed 
by issuing new shares. 
 








Third, let 𝐹𝐹𝐷𝐷 be the change in the NPV when the investment is financed by debt. 
 




    (8) 
 
In summary, 𝑅𝑅, the post-tax NPV, is the sum of 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅  and 𝐹𝐹, where 𝐹𝐹 = 0 for retained 
earnings, 𝐹𝐹 = 𝐹𝐹𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅 for new stock issuance, and 𝐹𝐹 = 𝐹𝐹𝐷𝐷 for debt. 
 
R = 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 + 𝐹𝐹       (9) 
 
 Finally, under the above settings, I obtain the cost of capital 𝑝𝑝� when 𝑅𝑅 = 0: 
 
𝑝𝑝� = (1−𝐴𝐴)(1−𝜏𝜏)(1+𝜋𝜋) {𝜌𝜌 + 𝛿𝛿(1 + 𝜋𝜋) − 𝜋𝜋} −
𝐹𝐹(1+𝜌𝜌)
𝛾𝛾(1−𝜏𝜏)(1+𝜋𝜋)
− 𝛿𝛿.    (10) 
 
Following King and Fullerton (1984), I define EMTR, where  ?̃?𝑟 =
��1 −𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖�𝑖𝑖 − 𝜋𝜋� (1− 𝜋𝜋)⁄ . I can then define EATR as in Devereux and Griffith (2003). 
 




 ,       (12) 
 




.       (13) 
 
Thus, EMTR and EATR can be calculated given the real interest rate 𝑟𝑟, inflation rate 𝜋𝜋, 
real return on capital before taxation 𝑝𝑝 , statutory tax rate 𝜏𝜏 , depreciation rate ∅ , 
economic capital depletion rate 𝛿𝛿, and other tax rate parameters（𝑚𝑚𝑑𝑑, 𝑐𝑐, 𝑧𝑧, 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖). 
 
2.2. Data 
 Following Egger et al. (2009) and the other studies, I use firm-specific financial 
data to determine the depreciation rate and economic capital depletion rate for individual 
firms. However, Egger et al. (2009) do not consider individual firms' asset shares only 
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because they apply industry-specific asset composition to individual firms' asset shares. 
The financial data of Japanese listed companies are obtained from the DVD version of 
Nikkei NEEDS Financial Data. The sample for this study includes about 2,000 firms that 
rose to the First and Second Sections of the Tokyo Stock Exchange, the Mothers section 
of the Tokyo Stock Exchange, the First and Second Sections of the Osaka Securities 
Exchange, the First and Second Sections of the Nagoya Stock Exchange, the Fukuoka 
Stock Exchange, the Sapporo Stock Exchange, and the JASDAQ. I use financial 
statement data from FY2007 to FY2019 for which these balance sheet asset data are 
available, as asset data on buildings and structures are not available from financial data 
prior to FY2006. Since the analysis will be based on fiscal years, the analysis data will be 
limited to listed companies with fiscal year-end in March, as most companies in Japan 
close their books at the end of March. 
 
3. Preliminary data 
 To calculate the firm-specific EATR and EMTR, I use the model parameters 
defined in the previous section. For the real interest rate r and the inflation rate π, I 
consider Case 1 and Case 2, as shown in Table 1. 
Case 1 (𝑟𝑟 = 0.05 and 𝜋𝜋 = 0.025 ) is the assumption used by Devereux and 
Griffith (2003), Egger et al. (2009), Egger and Lorentz (2010), Steinmüller et al. (2019), 
and Federici et al. (2020). Case 2 (𝑟𝑟 = 0.01944 and 𝜋𝜋 = 0.00462) is the assumption 
representing the Japanese economy. The inflation rate is the average rate from FY2014 to 
FY2019, calculated from the private sector's business capital investment deflator of the 
National Accounts gross fixed capital formation in Japan. The real interest rate is 
calculated using the average Bank of Japan short-term prime rates from FY2014 to 
FY2019 as the nominal interest rate, taking into account the inflation rate. 
 The assumption in Case 1 may be important for international comparisons to 
calculate the differences in EMTR and EATR due to taxation parameters. However, 
considering the current state of the Japanese economy, I assume that both the real interest 
rate (𝑟𝑟 = 0.05) and inflation rate (𝜋𝜋 = 0.025) are quite low. Thus, I assume that Case 2 
captures the current state of the Japanese economy (𝑟𝑟 = 0.01944 and 𝜋𝜋 = 0.00462). 
 In addition, most previous studies assume a pre-tax return on capital of 𝑝𝑝 = 0.2 
(see Table 1). Furthermore, for simplicity, I discard taxation at the individual level by 





Table 1. Key parameters for studies with firm-specific analysis 
 Egger et al. (2009) 
Egger and Lorentz 
(2010) 
Steinmüller et al. 
(2019) 
Federici et al. 
(2020) This study 
Real interest rate r 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 Case 1: 0.0500 Case 2: 0.01944 
Inflation rate π 0.025 0.025 0 0.025 Case 1: 0.0250 Case 2: 0.00462 
Pre-tax return on capital p 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
Rate of economic depreciation for 
building 𝛿𝛿𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐿𝐿 0.0361 0.0361 0 0.0361 0.047 
Rate of economic depreciation for 
structures 𝛿𝛿𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵 None None 0 None 0.0564 
Rate of economic depreciation for 
machinery 𝛿𝛿𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 0.1225 0.1225 0 0.01225 0.09489 
Rate of economic depreciation for 
ships and vehicles 𝛿𝛿𝑉𝑉𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵 None None 0 None 0.1470 
Rate of economic depreciation for 
tools, furniture, and fixtures 𝛿𝛿𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿 None None 0 None 0.0838 
Rate of economic depreciation for 
inventories 0 0 0 0 None 
Rate of economic depreciation for 
intangible assets 0.15 0.15 0 0.15 None 








FY2013 FY2014 FY2015 
FY2016 
FY2017 FY2018 FY2019 
National corporate 
income tax rate (basic 
rate) 𝜏𝜏𝑁𝑁 
30％ 25.5% 25.5% 23.9％ 23.4% 23.2% 23.2% 
Special income tax rate 
for reconstruction 𝜏𝜏𝑆𝑆 
0% 10.0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Local corporate tax rate 
𝜏𝜏𝐿𝐿 
0% 0% 0% 4.4% 4.4% 4.4% 4.4% 
Prefectural corporate 
inhabitant tax rate per 
income basis 𝜏𝜏𝑃𝑃 
5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 3.2% 3.2% 3.2% 3.2% 
Municipal corporate 
inhabitant tax rate per 
income basis 𝜏𝜏𝑀𝑀 
12.3% 12.3% 12.3% 9.7% 9.7% 9.7% 9.7% 
Enterprise tax rate per 
income 𝜏𝜏𝑅𝑅 
7.2% 7.2% 7.20% 2.90% 2.90% 2.90% 3.6% 
MOF-type effective tax 
rate 39.54% 37.00% 34.61% 32.1% 29.97% 29.74% 29.74% 
Note: Tax rates for large corporations with capital of 100 million yen or more. Enterprise tax rate for 
income from FY2014 to FY2018 incudes the special local corporate tax rate. The local corporate tax 
was introduced in 2015. This study also accounts for the special corporate tax for recovery from the 
Great East Japan Earthquake applied in 2012 and 2013.  
 




     (14) 
 
Here, are the national corporate income tax rate (basic rate) is 𝜏𝜏𝑁𝑁, the special income tax 
rate for reconstruction is 𝜏𝜏𝑆𝑆, the local corporate tax rate is 𝜏𝜏𝐿𝐿, the prefectural corporate 
inhabitant tax rate is 𝜏𝜏𝑃𝑃, the municipal corporate inhabitant tax rate per income basis is 
𝜏𝜏𝑀𝑀, and the enterprise tax rate for per income is 𝜏𝜏𝑅𝑅.1 The taxable base of the special 
income tax for reconstruction, local corporate tax, prefectural corporate inhabitant tax, 
and municipal corporate inhabitant tax per income basis is the amount of national 
corporate tax. The enterprise tax rate is in the denominator because enterprise tax is 
                                                        
1 The national corporate tax has a reduced tax rate in addition to the basic tax rate. The reduced 
tax rate is applied to the income of 8 million yen or less per year for small and medium-sized 
corporations. As I target listed firms for analysis, I use the basic tax rate. In addition, some local 
governments implemented excess taxation that raises the corporate inhabitant tax rate and the 
enterprise tax rate; however, I do not consider excess taxation and use the standard tax rate, 
which is the basic tax rate stipulated in the local tax law. 
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recognized as a deductible expense in the tax code (see Table 2 for specific tax rates). For 
example, for FY2019, the basic national corporate tax rate was 23.2%, the local corporate 
tax rate was 10.3%, the corporate inhabitant tax rate was 12.9%, and the enterprise tax 
rate was 3.6%. In this case, the MOF-type effective tax rate was 29.74% ≈ {(23.2% (1 + 
4.4% + 12.9%) + 3.6%)} / (1 + 3.6%). The tax rate from 2007 to 2011, before the tax rate 
reduction reform, was 39.54% ≈ {(30.0% (1 + 17.3%) + 7.2%)} / (1 + 7.2%). 
 Next, I give the depreciation rate for each asset. The depreciable assets I analyze 
here are buildings (BUIL); structures (STRU); machinery and equipment (MACH); ships 
and vehicles (VIHI); and tools, furniture, and fixtures (TOOL), with depreciation rates for 
tax purposes of ∅𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐿𝐿 , ∅𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵  , ∅𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 , ∅𝑉𝑉𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵  and ∅𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿 , respectively . Egger et al. 
(2009) and Egger and Lorentz (2010) include intangible assets in their analysis. However, 
I am interested in the economic effects of the depreciation reform, so I limit the analysis 
to depreciable assets in Japan. Egger et al. (2009) and Egger and Lorentz (2010) do not 
include vehicles and tools and equipment in their asset classification. 
 Table 3 summarizes the legal depreciation methods in Japan. Buildings are 
consistently depreciated by the straight-line method. Structures, machinery, and 
equipment; ships and vehicles; and tools, furniture, and fixtures changed from the old 
declining-balance method to the 250% declining-balance method in FY2007, and then to 
the 200% declining-balance method in FY2011. In addition, for structures, the declining-
balance method was changed to the straight-line method in FY2016. 
 
Table 3. Japan’s legal depreciation methods 
 Before  FY2006 
FY2007 to  
FY2010 




Buildings SLM SLM SLM SLM 
Structures 
Old DBM 250%DBM 200%DBM 
SLM 
Machinery and equipment 
200%DBM Ships and vehicles 
Tools, furniture and fixtures 
Note: DBM is declining-balance method and SLM is straight-line method. 
 
 The depreciation rate of the 250% declining-balance method introduced in 
FY2007, which replaced the old declining-balance method, is 2.5 times the depreciation 
rate of the straight-line method. I calculate the average useful life 𝐿𝐿 of each asset listed 
in the Japanese National Tax Agency's table by asset: 24.54 years for buildings; 27.18 
years for structures; 7.55 years for ships and vehicles; and 6.02 years for tools, furniture, 
and fixtures. The depreciation rates for each asset using the straight-line method ∅𝑆𝑆 is 
1 𝐿𝐿⁄  : ∅𝑆𝑆𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐿𝐿 = 0.040749 , ∅𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵 = 0.036786 , ∅𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 = 0.102078 , ∅𝑆𝑆𝑉𝑉𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵 =
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0.132383, and ∅𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿 = 0.166154. 
 Therefore, the depreciation rates of each asset by the 250% declining-balance 
method ∅𝐷𝐷250 are ∅𝐷𝐷250𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵 = 0.091965, ∅𝐷𝐷250𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 = 0.255194, ∅𝐷𝐷250𝑉𝑉𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵 = 0.330957, and 
∅𝐷𝐷250𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿 = 0.415385. The depreciation rate for the 200% declining-balance method ∅𝐷𝐷200 
is twice the rate for the straight-line method: ∅𝐷𝐷200𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵 = 0.073572, ∅𝐷𝐷200𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 = 0.204155, 
∅𝐷𝐷200𝑉𝑉𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵 = 0.264766, and ∅𝐷𝐷200𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿 = 0.332308. 
 In addition, the model provides the economic capital depletion rate δ. Let the 
economic capital depletion rates for each asset be 𝛿𝛿𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐿𝐿  , 𝛿𝛿𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵 , 𝛿𝛿𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀  , 𝛿𝛿𝑉𝑉𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵 , and 
𝛿𝛿𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿  . Using the estimated economic capital depletion rates by asset in Japan by 
Nakamura et al. (2017), I set 𝛿𝛿𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐿𝐿 = 0.047, 𝛿𝛿𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵 = 0.0564, 𝛿𝛿𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 = 0.09489, 
𝛿𝛿𝑉𝑉𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵 = 0.1470, and 𝛿𝛿𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿 = 0.08838. However, note that Nakamura et al. (2017) 
estimate economic capital depletion rates by capital good using real capital stock by 
industry based on listed firms' financial data. Table 1 summarizes the economic capital 
depletion rates from previous studies. 
 I use the balance sheet amounts for BUIL, STRU, MACH, VIHI, and TOOL and 





















     (19) 
Θ𝑗𝑗𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐿𝐿 + Θ𝑗𝑗𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵 + Θ𝑗𝑗𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 + Θ𝑗𝑗𝑉𝑉𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵 + Θ𝑗𝑗𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿 = 1     (20) 
 
Table 4 reports the asset shares estimated from FY2007 to FY2019. These average 




Table 4. Asset shares Θ and debt ratio 𝑏𝑏 
 ΘBUIL ΘSTRU ΘMACH ΘVIHI ΘTOOL b 
Minimum 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
10th percentile 0.2740 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0099 0.0000 
20th percentile 0.4102 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0194 0.0036 
30th percentile 0.5095 0.0077 0.0010 0.0000 0.0290 0.0424 
40th percentile 0.6000 0.0150 0.0182 0.0001 0.0402 0.0939 
50th percentile 0.6785 0.0223 0.0679 0.0007 0.0542 0.1512 
60th percentile 0.7519 0.0302 0.1551 0.0014 0.0738 0.2127 
70th percentile 0.8220 0.0404 0.2535 0.0027 0.1095 0.2784 
80th percentile 0.8839 0.0563 0.3542 0.0054 0.1822 0.3597 
90th percentile 0.9378 0.0893 0.4791 0.0163 0.3846 0.4755 
Maximum 1.0000 0.8730 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.9829 
Average 0.6362 0.0430 0.1683 0.0162 0.1363 0.1960 
Standard deviation 0.2580 0.0799 0.2039 0.0857 0.2072 0.1901 
No. of firms 27,750 27,750 27,750 27,750 27,750 27,750 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
 Using the above data, I calculate the depreciation rate 𝜙𝜙𝑗𝑗 , the economic capital 
depletion rate 𝛿𝛿𝑗𝑗  , and the discounted present value 𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗   of the tax savings from 



















𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿   (23) 
 
 As the financial data do not reveal the amount of new shares issued to finance 
investment, as in Egger et al. (2009) and other studies, I limit the financing of firms to 





,     (24) 
 
where 𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝑗𝑗  is short-term loans and bonds; 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑗𝑗  is long-term loans, bonds, and 
convertible bonds; and 𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗  is total assets (limited to 0<𝑏𝑏𝑗𝑗 <1), obtained from the 
12 
 
financial data. Table 3 reports the debt ratios estimated from FY2007 to FY2019. In 
FY2008, the average debt ratio was 22.09%, but in FY2018, it decreased to 18.60%. 
Hence, I can assume that companies are increasingly financing themselves through 
retained earnings. 
The debt ratio indicates the ratio of assets financed by debt, but not necessarily 
the debt financing portion of the investment funds. However, it is difficult to obtain the 
debt financing share of investment funds from financial statement data. Therefore, I 
consider the investment funds raised by debt to be a percentage of the debt ratio. 
 By using the above data and parameters, I can calculate the firm-specific EMTRs 
and EATRs. Tables 5 and 6 report the EATR estimation results for Cases 1 and 2, 





Table 5. Estimation results: EATR, Case 1 (𝑟𝑟 = 0.05 and 𝜋𝜋 = 0.025) 
EATR FY2007 FY2008 FY2009 FY2010 FY2011 FY2012 FY2013 FY2014 FY2015 FY2016 FY2017 FY2018 FY2019 
Minimum 0.1985 0.1985 0.1985 0.1985 0.2029 0.1887 0.1887 0.1755 0.1618 0.1502 0.1502 0.1490 0.1490 
10th percentile 0.2259 0.2297 0.2305 0.2317 0.2373 0.2209 0.2195 0.2038 0.1876 0.1740 0.1753 0.1721 0.1727 
20th percentile 0.2342 0.2360 0.2372 0.2380 0.2425 0.2264 0.2258 0.2104 0.1942 0.1811 0.1812 0.1795 0.1795 
30th percentile 0.2384 0.2399 0.2408 0.2418 0.2451 0.2290 0.2287 0.2134 0.1973 0.1841 0.1840 0.1824 0.1824 
40th percentile 0.2415 0.2426 0.2435 0.2440 0.2471 0.2309 0.2306 0.2153 0.1992 0.1860 0.1860 0.1842 0.1844 
50th percentile 0.2441 0.2451 0.2457 0.2462 0.2484 0.2322 0.2319 0.2167 0.2005 0.1874 0.1873 0.1857 0.1857 
60th percentile 0.2465 0.2472 0.2477 0.2479 0.2496 0.2332 0.2331 0.2176 0.2016 0.1885 0.1884 0.1869 0.1869 
70th percentile 0.2483 0.2487 0.2490 0.2494 0.2504 0.2340 0.2339 0.2186 0.2025 0.1892 0.1892 0.1878 0.1877 
80th percentile 0.2498 0.2500 0.2501 0.2503 0.2510 0.2346 0.2346 0.2193 0.2032 0.1899 0.1898 0.1884 0.1884 
90th percentile 0.2508 0.2509 0.2509 0.2510 0.2514 0.2351 0.2350 0.2198 0.2037 0.1903 0.1903 0.1888 0.1888 
Maximum 0.2576 0.2567 0.2575 0.2571 0.2587 0.2408 0.2408 0.2249 0.2087 0.2008 0.2010 0.1997 0.1997 
Average 0.2408 0.2420 0.2426 0.2431 0.2455 0.2294 0.2289 0.2135 0.1975 0.1844 0.1845 0.1828 0.1828 
Standard deviation 0.0112 0.0103 0.0101 0.0098 0.0089 0.0084 0.0090 0.0089 0.0088 0.0088 0.0085 0.0088 0.0087 
No. of firms 2,053 2,065 2,073 2,078 2,091 2,114 2,147 2,143 2,174 2,190 2,210 2,218 2,194 





Table 6. Estimation results: EATR, Case 2 (𝑟𝑟 = 0.01944 and 𝜋𝜋 = 0.00462) 
EATR FY2007 FY2008 FY2009 FY2010 FY2011 FY2012 FY2013 FY2014 FY2015 FY2016 FY2017 FY2018 FY2019 
Minimum 0.3241 0.3241 0.3241 0.3241 0.3253 0.3040 0.3040 0.2841 0.2632 0.2454 0.2454 0.2435 0.2436 
10th percentile 0.3339 0.3353 0.3356 0.3360 0.3378 0.3157 0.3151 0.2943 0.2726 0.2540 0.2544 0.2519 0.2522 
20th percentile 0.3369 0.3375 0.3378 0.3381 0.3395 0.3175 0.3173 0.2967 0.2749 0.2564 0.2564 0.2544 0.2544 
30th percentile 0.3382 0.3387 0.3390 0.3392 0.3403 0.3183 0.3182 0.2976 0.2758 0.2574 0.2573 0.2553 0.2553 
40th percentile 0.3392 0.3395 0.3397 0.3399 0.3408 0.3188 0.3187 0.2980 0.2763 0.2578 0.2578 0.2558 0.2558 
50th percentile 0.3399 0.3401 0.3403 0.3404 0.3410 0.3190 0.3189 0.2983 0.2766 0.2582 0.2581 0.2562 0.2562 
60th percentile 0.3405 0.3406 0.3407 0.3407 0.3411 0.3191 0.3190 0.2984 0.2767 0.2583 0.2583 0.2563 0.2563 
70th percentile 0.3408 0.3408 0.3409 0.3409 0.3412 0.3192 0.3192 0.2985 0.2768 0.2584 0.2584 0.2564 0.2564 
80th percentile 0.3409 0.3410 0.3410 0.3410 0.3414 0.3193 0.3193 0.2987 0.2769 0.2585 0.2585 0.2566 0.2566 
90th percentile 0.3411 0.3411 0.3411 0.3411 0.3416 0.3195 0.3195 0.2989 0.2771 0.2588 0.2588 0.2569 0.2568 
Maximum 0.3455 0.3456 0.3455 0.3452 0.3466 0.3240 0.3239 0.3029 0.2809 0.2640 0.2641 0.2621 0.2620 
Average 0.3386 0.3389 0.3391 0.3393 0.3401 0.3181 0.3179 0.2973 0.2755 0.2571 0.2572 0.2551 0.2552 
Standard deviation 0.0036 0.0032 0.0032 0.0031 0.0029 0.0028 0.0030 0.0029 0.0029 0.0029 0.0028 0.0029 0.0029 
No. of firms 2,053 2,065 2,073 2,078 2,091 2,114 2,147 2,143 2,174 2,190 2,210 2,218 2,194 






Table 7. Estimation results: EMTR, Case 1 (𝑟𝑟 = 0.05 and 𝜋𝜋 = 0.025) 
EMTR FY2007 FY2008 FY2009 FY2010 FY2011 FY2012 FY2013 FY2014 FY2015 FY2016 FY2017 FY2018 FY2019 
Minimum -0.7750 -1.0355 -0.8540 -0.8331 -0.9823 -0.8542 -0.8081 -0.7064 -0.6176 -0.5293 -0.5161 -0.5246 -0.5332 
10th percentile 0.0671 0.0309 0.0476 0.0574 0.0834 0.0710 0.0720 0.0604 0.0399 0.0371 0.0389 0.0328 0.0286 
20th percentile 0.1407 0.1098 0.1270 0.1409 0.1594 0.1389 0.1448 0.1299 0.1070 0.0972 0.0988 0.0926 0.0872 
30th percentile 0.1877 0.1630 0.1765 0.1839 0.2042 0.1831 0.1908 0.1706 0.1482 0.1348 0.1404 0.1314 0.1290 
40th percentile 0.2176 0.2042 0.2163 0.2238 0.2399 0.2201 0.2230 0.2028 0.1784 0.1638 0.1685 0.1632 0.1592 
50th percentile 0.2495 0.2373 0.2448 0.2523 0.2693 0.2485 0.2489 0.2291 0.2038 0.1867 0.1905 0.1873 0.1842 
60th percentile 0.2775 0.2681 0.2738 0.2811 0.2939 0.2714 0.2719 0.2512 0.2262 0.2075 0.2105 0.2080 0.2058 
70th percentile 0.3001 0.2946 0.3016 0.3052 0.3161 0.2928 0.2926 0.2699 0.2463 0.2276 0.2289 0.2259 0.2247 
80th percentile 0.3212 0.3199 0.3244 0.3271 0.3364 0.3125 0.3119 0.2878 0.2617 0.2421 0.2429 0.2408 0.2399 
90th percentile 0.3424 0.3431 0.3458 0.3463 0.3520 0.3260 0.3260 0.3009 0.2756 0.2540 0.2546 0.2525 0.2521 
Maximum 0.3684 0.3677 0.3689 0.3683 0.3743 0.3452 0.3458 0.3199 0.2952 0.2733 0.2720 0.2703 0.2823 
Average 0.2143 0.2048 0.2141 0.2203 0.2360 0.2158 0.2179 0.1988 0.1755 0.1611 0.1639 0.1594 0.1562 
Standard deviation 0.1437 0.1413 0.1361 0.1332 0.1276 0.1200 0.1168 0.1106 0.1065 0.0989 0.0976 0.0997 0.1020 
No. of firms 2,053 2,065 2,073 2,078 2,091 2,114 2,147 2,143 2,174 2,190 2,210 2,218 2,194 





Table 8. Estimation results: EATR, Case 2 (𝑟𝑟 = 0.01944 and 𝜋𝜋 = 0.00462) 
EMTR FY2007 FY2008 FY2009 FY2010 FY2011 FY2012 FY2013 FY2014 FY2015 FY2016 FY2017 FY2018 FY2019 
Minimum -0.5734 -0.7188 -0.6273 -0.6134 -0.7217 -0.6304 -0.5993 -0.5248 -0.4584 -0.3919 -0.3829 -0.3886 -0.3949 
10th percentile 0.0799 0.0519 0.0626 0.0733 0.1015 0.0868 0.0874 0.0796 0.0629 0.0583 0.0601 0.0570 0.0495 
20th percentile 0.1419 0.1169 0.1310 0.1408 0.1598 0.1442 0.1473 0.1355 0.1164 0.1066 0.1103 0.1039 0.1013 
30th percentile 0.1851 0.1631 0.1746 0.1815 0.1989 0.1812 0.1883 0.1709 0.1507 0.1411 0.1460 0.1390 0.1354 
40th percentile 0.2116 0.1999 0.2099 0.2156 0.2300 0.2137 0.2161 0.1988 0.1787 0.1651 0.1689 0.1644 0.1610 
50th percentile 0.2396 0.2284 0.2354 0.2418 0.2572 0.2381 0.2397 0.2218 0.2005 0.1857 0.1891 0.1859 0.1833 
60th percentile 0.2640 0.2560 0.2610 0.2666 0.2794 0.2595 0.2604 0.2433 0.2208 0.2045 0.2068 0.2046 0.2023 
70th percentile 0.2855 0.2806 0.2867 0.2895 0.2993 0.2782 0.2795 0.2593 0.2378 0.2215 0.2226 0.2198 0.2181 
80th percentile 0.3040 0.3032 0.3068 0.3091 0.3176 0.2957 0.2962 0.2744 0.2516 0.2340 0.2346 0.2331 0.2323 
90th percentile 0.3217 0.3224 0.3248 0.3248 0.3310 0.3074 0.3072 0.2851 0.2617 0.2430 0.2432 0.2414 0.2410 
Maximum 0.3514 0.3498 0.3495 0.3490 0.3616 0.3302 0.3303 0.3053 0.2886 0.2647 0.2658 0.2644 0.2756 
Average 0.2103 0.2022 0.2099 0.2150 0.2292 0.2116 0.2133 0.1968 0.1766 0.1638 0.1663 0.1624 0.1598 
Standard deviation 0.1217 0.1188 0.1152 0.1129 0.1083 0.1016 0.0996 0.0937 0.0900 0.0836 0.0825 0.0842 0.0861 
No. of firms 2,053 2,065 2,073 2,078 2,091 2,114 2,147 2,143 2,174 2,190 2,210 2,218 2,194 





4. EATRs and EMTRs in the 2010s 
This section presents the results of analyzing the data in Section 3 using the 
model presented in Section 2 to evaluate Japan's corporate income tax reform in the 2010s. 
First, I compare the estimated average EATR and EMTR with the change in the MOF-
type effective tax rates. Second, I analyze the changes in the distributions of EATR and 
EMTR.  
Figure 1 illustrates the average EATR and EMTR for Case 1 and Case 2, and the 
MOF-type effective tax rates. The MOF-type effective tax rate, which was over 40% in 
FY2011, fell below 30% in FY2016 after the corporate income tax reform starting in 
FY2012. The rate was 39.54% before the tax rate reduction and 29.74% thereafter, a 
decrease of 9.8 percentage points. I will examine how the effective tax rate changed as a 
result of the tax rate reduction as well as the reform of the depreciation method. 
 
 
Figure 1. EATR, EMTR, and MOF-type effective tax rates. 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
The magnitude of the EATR is quite different for Case 1 and Case 2 due to the 
differing assumptions of the real interest rate and the inflation rate. The EATRs of Case 
2, which reflects the actual Japanese economy, is lower than the EATRs of Case 1, which 

























































is because the lower the real interest rate and inflation rate are, the lower the EATRs are. 
The EATRs differ significantly between Case 1 and Case 2, but the EMTRs are not 
significantly different.  
The average EATR before the tax reform in Case 1 is about 24%, and after the 
tax reform, it was about 18%, a decrease of 6 percentage points. Compared to the 9.8 
percentage point decline in the MOF-type effective tax rate, the smaller decline in EATR 
occurred because the depreciation reforms expanded the tax base. On the other hand, the 
EMTRs are lower than the EATRs. Before the tax reform, the average EMTR was about 
21%; after the tax reform, it was about 16%, a decrease of 5%. Here, too, the MOF-type 
effective tax rate is smaller than the reduction. In line with the decline in the MOF-type 
effective tax rate, the average EMTR also generally declined, but it did rise in some fiscal 
years. For example, the increase in EMTR in FY2011 is due to the introduction of the 
200% declining-balance method to replace the 250% declining-balance method.  
I should note that the EATRs and EMTRs in Figure 1 are the average changes. 
In this study, I estimate the effective tax rates of individual firms. The differences in asset 
composition and financing of individual firms create the distributions in the estimated 
EATR and EMTR.  
 
 
Figure 2. Distribution of EATR. 












































































































































Figure 2 illustrates the distributions of EATR for each year in Case 1 and Case 
2. There is a significant difference in the location of the EATR distribution between 
Case 1 and Case 2; the EATR distribution is moving toward lower tax rates as the MOF-
type effective tax rate decreases due to the tax reform. 
Figure 3 shows the distributions of EMTR for each year in Case 1 and Case 2. 
Unlike the EATR, there is no significant difference in the location of the EMTR 
distribution between the cases. Compared to the EATR distribution, the EMTR 
distribution is skewed to the right. The reason for this is that the distribution of the debt 
ratio is skewed and the cost of capital from retained earnings is smaller than the cost of 
capital from debt financing. 
 
 
Figure 3. Distribution of EMTR. 
Source: Author’s calculations. Case 1 is a solid line and Case 2 is a dotted line. 
 
5. Effects of the tax reform on the EATR and EMTR 
The EATR and EMTR estimation results in the previous section show a mixture 
of the tax rate reduction and depreciation reform. Therefore, I decompose Japan's 
corporate income tax reforms in the 2010s into tax rate reductions and changes in 
depreciation methods and analyze the impact of these changes on EATR and EMTR with 


































tax reform as the baseline. I apply the same real interest rate and inflation rate as in Case 
2 (𝑟𝑟 = 0.01944 and 𝜋𝜋 = 0.00462). Scenario 1 assumes the same depreciation method 
as in the baseline, but the MOF-type effective tax rate is set at 29.74% in FY2019. 
Scenario 2 assumes the MOF-type effective tax rate as in the baseline, but the depreciation 
method for structures is the straight-line method, which represents the depreciation 
reform in FY2016. In Scenario 3, the MOF-type effective rate is the same as in the 
baseline, but the depreciation method for depreciable assets other than buildings is the 
200% declining-balance method. This represents the depreciation reform in FY2011. By 
considering these scenarios, I can extract the pure effects of Japan's corporate income tax 
reform on EATRs and EMTRs. Table 9 summarizes the baseline and various scenarios. 
 
Table 9. Simulation Scenarios and Baseline 
 Baseline Case 2 FY2010 Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 
MOF-type effective tax rate 𝜏𝜏 39.54％ 29.74％ 39.54％ 39.54％ 
Depreciation method for BUIL SLM SLM SLM SLM 
Depreciation method for STRU 250%DBM 250%DBM SLM 200%DBM 
Depreciation method for MACH 250%DBM 250%DBM 250%DBM 200%DBM 
Depreciation method for VIHI 250%DBM 250%DBM 250%DBM 200%DBM 
Depreciation method for TOOL 250%DBM 250%DBM 250%DBM 200%DBM 
Real interest rate 𝑟𝑟 (Case 2) 0.01944 0.01944 0.01944 0.01944 
Inflation rate 𝜋𝜋 (Case 2) 0.00462 0.00462 0.00462 0.00462 
Note: DBM is declining-balance method and SLM is straight-line method. 
 
 Tables 10 and 11 provide the simulation results for EATR and EMTR. I evaluate 
the tax reform by looking at the change in average EATR and EMTR using baseline as a 
reference. First, Scenario 1, which examines the MOF-type effective tax rate, shows 
lower values for both EATR and EMTR. The MOF-type effective tax rate decreases by 
9.8 percentage points, but comparing the baseline with Scenario 1, the EATR decreases 
by 8.46 percentage points (from 33.93% to 25.47%) and the EMTR by 6.45 percentage 
points (from 21.50% to 15.05%). Both reductions are less than the MOF-type effective 




Table 10. EATR simulation results  
Statistic Baseline Scenario1 Scenario2 Scenario3 
Minimum 0.3241 0.2423 0.3241 0.3253 
10th percentile 0.3360 0.2520 0.3364 0.3375 
20th percentile 0.3381 0.2537 0.3387 0.3395 
30th percentile 0.3392 0.2546 0.3397 0.3403 
40th percentile 0.3399 0.2552 0.3404 0.3407 
50th percentile 0.3404 0.2557 0.3408 0.3410 
60th percentile 0.3407 0.2559 0.3410 0.3411 
70th percentile 0.3409 0.2562 0.3412 0.3412 
80th percentile 0.3410 0.2563 0.3413 0.3414 
90th percentile 0.3411 0.2563 0.3417 0.3416 
Maximum 0.3452 0.2592 0.3494 0.3467 
Average 0.3393 0.2547 0.3397 0.3401 
Standard deviation 0.0031 0.0025 0.0032 0.0028 
No. of firms 2,078 2,078 2,078 2,078 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
Table 11. EMTR simulation results 
Statistic Baseline Scenario1 Scenario2 Scenario3 
Minimum -0.6134 -0.3599 -0.6134 -0.5436 
10th percentile 0.0733 0.0428 0.0858 0.0928 
20th percentile 0.1408 0.0918 0.1475 0.1545 
30th percentile 0.1815 0.1215 0.1878 0.1967 
40th percentile 0.2156 0.1481 0.2199 0.2287 
50th percentile 0.2418 0.1681 0.2457 0.2524 
60th percentile 0.2666 0.1880 0.2712 0.2767 
70th percentile 0.2895 0.2064 0.2926 0.2981 
80th percentile 0.3091 0.2225 0.3122 0.3167 
90th percentile 0.3248 0.2354 0.3279 0.3308 
Maximum 0.3490 0.2558 0.3567 0.3604 
Average 0.2150 0.1505 0.2205 0.2274 
Standard deviation 0.1129 0.0822 0.1105 0.1067 
No. of firms 2,078 2,078 2,078 2,078 
Source: Author’s calculations.  
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 For Scenario 2, which changes the depreciation method for structures from the 
250% declining-balance method to the straight-line method, there is little change in the 
EATR but an increase of 1 percentage points in the average EMTR (from 21.50% to 
22.05%). This is because the straight-line depreciation method is less favorable than the 
250% declining-balance method. This effect is limited to companies that own structures. 
 Scenario 3, which changes the depreciation method for structures; machinery 
and equipment; vehicles and transportation equipment; and tools, furniture, and fixtures 
from the 250% declining-balance method to the 200% declining-balance method, results 
in little change in the EATR but a 1.24 percentage point increase in the average EMTR 
(from 21.5% to 22.74%). This impact on EMTR is larger than Scenario 2. The MOF-type 




Figure 4. Distribution of EMTR changes from the baseline with each Scenario. 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
 Figure 4 depicts the change in the EMTR distribution from the baseline with 
each scenario, minus the baseline EMTR. Scenario 1 is a large negative shift in the 
distribution because the tax rate reduction changes the EMTR of all firms. Scenarios 2 


















































Scenario 2 does. Scenario 2 represents the change in depreciation method for structures 
only, while Scenario 3 represents the change the depreciation method for non-buildings. 
Therefore, the difference between Scenarios 2 and 3 is caused by the difference in the 
depreciable assets under reform. Scenario 3, which represents a reform to a larger range 
of assets than Scenario 2 thus has a larger impact on EMTR than Scenario 2. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 This study evaluated Japan's corporate income tax reform in the 2010s by 
estimating the EATR and EMTR for individual Japanese firms. As in many countries, 
Japan reduced the statutory tax rate and simultaneously expanded the tax base by 
reforming the allowable depreciation methods. The MOF-type effective tax rate is a 
combination of statutory tax rates, and although it is possible to measure the effect of the 
tax rate reduction, it is impossible to measure the change in the depreciation method. 
Therefore, it is necessary to estimate the EATR and EMTR to evaluate the tax reform. 
 The EATR and EMTR estimates, first presented by Devereux and Griffith (2003), 
have been used for international comparisons, such as by the OECD (2020). On the other 
hand, several studies estimate the EATR and EMTR using individual firm data, as in 
Egger et al. (2009). In line with these previous studies, I estimate the EATR and EMTR 
for individual Japanese firms and evaluate Japan's corporate income tax reform. 
 The magnitude of the EATR depends on the assumption of the real interest rate 
and inflation rate. When these rates are low, which is similar to the situation in Japan’s 
economy, the EATR will be high. On the other hand, these factors have little effect on the 
EMTR. The EATR does not decline as much as the reduction in the MOF-type effective 
tax rate, as the depreciation methods were changed and the tax base expanded. Although 
the reduction in the MOF-type effective tax rate lowered the EMTR, the change in the 
depreciation method increased the EMTR in some cases. 
 The tax reforms include a mixture of both tax rate reductions and changes in 
depreciation methods. Therefore, I analyzed the effects of tax reform by decomposing 
these reforms. The baseline year is FY2010, the year before the tax reform, and ran 
simulations for both the tax rate cut and the change in depreciation method. The tax rate 
reduction lowered the EATR and EMTR. The change in depreciation method had little 
impact on the EATR, but a significant impact on the EMTR. The change from the 250% 
to the 200% declining-balance method for depreciable assets other than buildings raised 
the EMTR for companies owning these assets. A switch from the 250% declining-balance 




 Thus, Japan's corporate income tax reforms in the 2010s raised the EMTRs by 
broadening the tax base through the revision of depreciation methods, although the 
EATRs declined due to the lower tax rates. The overall effect of the corporate income tax 
reform is that the effect of the tax rate reduction exceeded that of the depreciation method 
reforms, and thus the EMTR also declined. 
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